Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey by Susan M. Collins & Won-Am Park
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume
3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-30455-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sach89-2
Conference Date: September 21-23, 1987
Publication Date: 1989
Chapter Title: Exchange Rates, Wages, and Productivity
Chapter Author: Susan M. Collins, Won-Am Park
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9040
Chapter pages in book: (p. 270 - 282)270  Susan  M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
10  Exchange Rates, Wages, and 
Productivity 
In this chapter we continue our discussion of exchange rate policy in Korea. 
We  focus on the linkage between exchange rates and competitiveness, and 
relate them to labor productivity and to the behavior of nominal wages. The 
issues are especially interesting because of  one unusual aspect of  Korea's 
adjustment:  real  wages  rose  by  43 percent  during  1982-86  despite a 34 
percent depreciation of  the real  exchange rate.'  The puzzle  emerges,  not 
because negatively correlated real wages and exchange rates are theoretically 
implausible, but because there seem to be so few examples in practice. Many 
countries  would  like  to  devalue  so  as  to  improve  competitiveness  and 
external balance, but avoid doing so precisely because of a desire to maintain 
real incomes and consumption. 
The  links  between  real  exchange  rates  and  real  wages  are  important 
precisely because they embody  the tradeoffs between competitiveness and 
the standard of  living. It is widely recognized that a nominal depreciation 
which  does  not  result  in  a  real  depreciation because  of  induced  rises  in 
domestic goods and factor prices is likely to have little effect on the trade 
balance. At the same time, domestic real incomes will decline if  wages do 
not rise enough to offset the loss in purchasing power from higher traded 
goods prices. A reduced standard of living is often viewed as the price paid 
for an increase in competitiveness. 
In addition to these issues, capital flight problems and fiscal and monetary 
policy are also integral to exchange rate policy decisions (Diaz Alejandro 
1981 and Dornbusch  1985b). Latin American countries, in particular, have 
suffered  from  large budget  deficits  financed by  money  creation,  massive 
capital flight, high  inflation rates,  and overvalued currencies. Accelerating 
wages and prices which exacerbate the overvaluation are especially likely 
when  a  government  adopts  an  accommodating macroeconomic  policy- 
expectations of  an  accommodating policy  will  tend  to  result  in  slower 
adjustment of  wages in response to unemployment (Dornbusch 1982). 
Korea has a very different background: sound fiscal policy, strict capital 
controls which rule out capital flight, and wages which are not indexed to 
past  inflation.  Furthermore,  rapid  productivity  growth  has  mitigated  the 
conflicts  between  competitiveness  and  real  income.  Active  government 
policies  in  allocation  of  resources  seem  to  have  enhanced  productivity 
growth. 
This chapter explores lessons from the Korean episode. The first section 
discusses the relationship between  the  various relative price  measures.  In 
particular, we  focus on the real wage, an important internal relative price, 
and various external relative prices, including a number of  measures of the 271  KoredChapter  10 
real exchange rate. Section 10.2 documents the behavior of  real wages and 
exchange rates. In Section 10.3 we examine the determinants of wages. The 
chapter concludes with  a discussion of  the  lessons to be  learned and  the 
implications for policymakers in other countries. 
10.1  Theoretical Background 
exchange rates. We  begin by defining key variables. 
This  section  specifies  the  relationship  between  real  wages  and  real 
e  =  wonlforeign currency (nominal effective exchange rate); 
w is the nominal wage; 
Pi,  i = X,M,N are indices for export, import and nontraded goods prices; 
p  = Pg P& P;  is the Korean CPI, where a  +  /3  +  y = 1; 
p* is a foreign price index; 
PT = P;;/(a+P)Pg(a++P)  is an index of traded goods prices; 
Oi,  i =  T,N  are  indices  of  labor  productivity  (output/worker)  in  the 
There are four variables of interest. Equations (1) and (2) give two measures 
of  the real exchange rate. The first is the typical measure relating domestic 
and  foreign prices. The second is the ratio of  traded to nontraded goods 
prices in Korea. An increase in either represents a real depreciation. 
(1)  R =  ep*/p 
tradable and nontradable goods sectors. 
(2)  /A.  =  PTIPN 
Equation (3) denotes the real  wage while equation (4) denotes unit labor 
costs of  tradable goods measured in  foreign currency, another measure of 
competitiveness. 
(3)  w =  w/p 
(4)  {=wl(e.O,) 
To  highlight the role of  labor productivity in determining the behavior of 
these four variables, we assume a very simple price setting structure. Korea 
is  assumed  to  take  the  price  of  imported  goods  as  given.  Export  and 
nontraded goods prices are assumed to be determined by costs. Both types of 
goods are produced using labor and imported intermediates. 
(5)  PM=e.P& 
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Substituting (5)-(7)  into  equations  (1)-(3)  allows  us  to  rewrite  the  real 
exchange rates and  the  real  wage  in  terms  of  labor productivity, nominal 
wages, the nominal exchange rate, and the world price of  imports. 
aa  +  yb  ey'eGb 
R=p*  * (i)  (p&)l-aa-yb 
A comparison of  equations (8) and (9) shows how the two real exchange 
rate measures might move in opposite directions. If labor productivity grows 
more quickly in the tradables sector than in  the nontradables sector, R  will 
depreciate but the domestic relative price of nontradables will rise, implying 
that p will appreciate. Note that b-a8 is likely to exceed one. It must do so 
if  tradable  goods  production  uses  more  imported  intermediates  than 
nontradables. 
Equation (10) shows that the real wage increases when labor productivity 
rises in either sector, when nominal wages rise relative to the domestic price 
of  importables, or when the nominal exchange rate appreciates. However, 
real depreciations result from nominal wage declines or nominal deprecia- 
tions (eq. [8] and [9]), creating a tradeoff between competitiveness and the 
standard of living, 
Equations (8) and (10) also show that productivity growth can eliminate 
the sharp conflict between these two objectives by  creating a cushion. Real 
wages may rise while the real exchange rate depreciates (and unit labor costs 
in  foreign currency fall),  and  as long  as  productivity is growing strongly 
enough. The condition for this scenario is that nominal wage growth exceed 
the  domestic  inflation rate  but  not  the  sum  of  nominal  depreciation and 
productivity growth. 
10.2  The Korean Experience 
In  table  10.1  we  present  data  on  the  behavior  of  wages,  prices, 
productivity,  and  unit  labor costs  in  manufacturing since  1960. The table 
presents two  measures  of  productivity.  One  (col. A) comes from surveys 
conducted  by  the  KPC,  while  the  other  (col.  B)  gives  value  added  per 
employee (VA). Neither is an ideal measure, and it is difficult to classify one 
as consistently better. Unfortunately, the two tell different stories. While real 
wages  grew  on  average  by  8.5  percent  per  year  during  1964-86, 
manufacturing productivity grew by 6.8 percent according to VA  but by  12.4 Table 10.1  Wages, Productivity, and Unit Labor Cost in Manufacturing (in percentages) 
Nominal Wages (A)  Real Wages  Labor Productivity  Unit Labor Cost (Won)  Unit Labor Cost (US.  dollars) 
Value 
CPI  KPC  added per 










































































































































































































































































































































































74.3  7.4 
50.8  -31.6 
41.1  -19.2 
45.7  11.2 
47.6  4.2 
49.2  3.3 
50.1  1.9 
52.3  4.4 
49.2  -6.0 
45.8  -6.9 
42.3  7.6 
58.7  19.1 
56.0  -4.6 
70.1  25.1 
85.0  21.3 
101.9  20.0 
113.1  11.0 
100.0  -  11.6 
90.7  -9.3 
89.9  -0.9 
83.7  -6.9 
78.8  -5.8 
75.0  -4.9 
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Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
"Index made by  Korea Productivity Center using output per production worker. 
bConsumer price index in Seoul. 274  Susan M. Collins and  Won-Am Park 
percent according to  the KPC.  While the KPC measure was  widely  used 
during the  1970s, it suggests implausibly rapid productivity growth during 
the  crisis  of  the  early  1980s.  For  this  reason,  and  for  reasons  of 
comparability, the VA  measure has become more widely used recently. Our 
discussion will refer to both series. 
A key point that emerges from table 10.1, together with the exchange rate 
data in table 9.7, is that Korea has experienced a number of years in which 
real wages grew while the real exchange rate depreciated. The combination 
occurred during both  1971-73  and 1982-85. 
However, it is important to point out that real wages have not increased 
continuously during the Korean industrialization. They declined both at the 
outset  of  Korea’s  export-led  growth  and  as  Korea  reestablished  its 
competitive position after the 1975-79  real appreciation. Real wages fell by 
10.5 percent  during  1962-64  despite  a  15.1  percent  increase  in  labor 
productivity (KPC), and by 7.1 percent during 1980-81  despite 30.6 percent 
(KPC) or 6.7 percent (VA) growth in productivity. 
Both measures of  productivity identify the 1973-79  Big Push as a period 
in which rapid real wage gains outstripped productivity growth. As discussed 
further below, the rapid nominal wage increases during this period have been 
attributed  to competition for  scarce skilled labor, in  conjunction with  the 
push toward heavy  industry. At the same time,  the expansion of  overseas 
construction contracts exacerbated the shortages of  some types of domestic 
labor, with the resultant wage increases spreading to workers elsewhere. 
We  examined the real wage behavior in more detail over four time periods 
from 1964 to 1985 in table 10.2. From equation (10) the key factors are the 
nominal  wage  relative  to  the  domestic  price  of  imports  and  labor 
productivity.  In  the  discussion  below,  we  focus  on  the  VA  measure  of 
productivity. 
The table  shows that  the  1969-73  slowdown in  real  wages  is  in  part 
attributable  to  a  slowdown  in  overall  productivity,  but  that  the  more 
important factor  is  a decline  in  nominal  wages  relative to  imports.  This 
represents both a moderation of  nominal wage gains and a deterioration in 
the terms of trade. 
Real wage growth accelerated during 1973-79.  During this period, very 
rapid nominal wage gains offset continued terms of  trade deterioration. The 
slowdown  in  1979-85  again  arises  from  reduced  productivity  growth 
combined with a substantial deceleration of nominal wage gains. Real wages 
fell at the beginning of the recent adjustment (1980-81),  with all productivity 
gains going to increase competitiveness. This, plus exchange rate deprecia- 
tion, improved Korea’s competitive position. 
The table very  clearly shows that real wages have grown more quickly 
during real appreciations. However, there has been no clear relation between 
real wage growth and the terms of  trade. Not  surprisingly, rising domestic 
production costs during periods of  rapid real wage growth have tended  to 
increase the price of  nontradables relative to imported goods.  In addition, Table 10.2  Determinants of  the Real WageExchange Rate Linkage (average annual percentage change) 
Real  Relative 
Effective  Price of  Terms  Labor  Labor  Productivity (Value Added)  Wages in  Real  Trade 
Period  Wage  Rate  to Nontraded"  Trade  (KPC)  Manufacturing  Nonmanufacturing  Total  Importsb  Cost  Ratio' 
1964-69  10.6  -3.7  -  10.0  3.5  16.9  6.6  5.9  5.9  21.3  3.0  93.0 
1969-73  6.9  8.1  2.3  -1.4  9.9  11.3  2.7  4.2  0.7  -3.3  -  1.4 
1913-19  12.2  -4.8  -  5.9  -  1.4  11.5  7.5  4.9  6.1  13.4  -  0.4  5.3 
1979-85  3.7  3.8  1.4  -1.4  11.2  3.3  4.5  4.2  2.5  -0.1  4.2 
Real  Exchange  Imported  of  Productivity  Terms of  Capital  Liberalization 
'(Dollar  unit price of imports  x  nominal exchange rate)/nonmanufacturing deflator. 
bNominal wages in manufacturin@(doIlar  unit price of imports  X  nominal exchange rate) 
'Based  on calculation in  K. S. Kim (1986). 276  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
there is some evidence of a positive correlation between real wage gains and 
labor productivity growth. 
From the table, we can also support the view that exchange rate policy has 
been  used  to  offset  slowdowns  in  productivity  growth  and  to  maintain 
Korea’s competitiveness in international markets. Authorities depreciated the 
real exchange rate during 1969-73  and  1979-85.  Overall productivity (VA) 
had  declined  in both  periods.  In contrast, the fixed exchange rate  and real 
depreciation  of  the  1970s coincided with  rapid  overall productivity  gains, 
although productivity growth slowed in the manufacturing  sector. 
We  have already seen that the real exchange rate (R) appreciated  in some 
periods  but  depreciated  in  others,  despite the  fact  that  productivity  grew 
rapidly by  international  standards  throughout.  However, using  the price  of 
traded  relative  to nontraded  goods (p) as  a measure of  the  real  exchange 
rate, Korea has experienced a continuous real appreciation, as shown in table 
10.3. To compute these figures,  we use manufacturing  and nonmanufactur- 
ing as proxies for the traded and nontraded goods sectors respectively. 
One reason for the faster inflation in the nontraded goods sector has been 
relatively  slower productivity  growth  in  that  sector.  Differential  inflation 
rates  emerged  in  the  mid- 1960s as productivity  growth accelerated  in  the 
manufacturing sector. According to the VA  measure, productivity  growth in 
nontradables began to  outpace productivity  growth in manufacturing  in :he 
1980s. As shown, the inflation differential narrowed considerably during this 
period. 
It is interesting to compare unit labor costs in Korea with the costs of its 
main trading  partners  and with costs in other newly  industrialized  nations, 
which  compete  with  Korea  in  third  markets.  Korean  unit  labor  costs 
measured  in  U.S.  dollars declined  by  30.3 percent  from  1979 to  1984. In 
contrast, the U.S. Department of  Labor reports that dollar unit labor costs 
for U.S. industries rose by over 22 percent during the same period. Japanese 
unit labor costs declined  by  3.7 percent  measured  in yen  and  11.6 percent 
measured in dollars. 
The figures in table  10.4 compare the Korean and Taiwanese growth rates 
of unit labor costs measured in U.S. dollars. During the late 1970s, the rapid 
increases  in  Korean  wages  implied  a  substantial  loss  in  competitiveness 
vis-a-vis  Taiwan.  During  1979-82,  however,  Korean  labor costs grew by 
just 2 percent  per  year,  compared with nearly  10 percent annual growth  in 
Taiwan.  The  divergence  persisted  during  1982-86  as  Korea’s  major 
depreciation led to a decline in labor costs. Although the countries have had 
similar gains in productivity, exchange rate policy in Korea has significantly 
improved its position relative to that of  Taiwan. 
10.3  Wage Determination in Korea 
The  above  discussion  highlights  the  magnitude  of  nominal  wage 
adjustments as a factor in Korea’s ability to combine depreciation  with real Table 10.3  Relative Price of Manufacturing Goods and Productivity (average annual percent change) 
Deflator  Labor Productivity" 
Real  Relative 
Relative  Relative  Effective  Price of 
Manufacturing  Nonmanufacturing  Price  Manufacturing  Nonmanufacturing  Productivity  Exchange  Imported 
Period  (A)  (B)  WB)  (A)  (B)  WB)  Rate  to  Nontradedb 
1960-64  22.0  22.2  -0.2  -  1.4  8.2  -8.9 
1964-69  8.0  13.3  -4.6  6.6  5.9  0.6  -3.7  -  10.0 
1969-73  9.3  15.3  -5.2  11.3  2.7  8.4  8.  I  2.3 
1973-79  17.2  23.8  -5.4  7.5  4.9  2.5  -4.8  -5.9 
1979-85  8.0  10.2  -2.1  3.3  4.5  -1.1  3.8  1.4 
"Labor productivity is defined here as the value-added per worker. 
b(Dollar unit price of imports  X  nominal exchange rate)inonmanufacturing deflator. 278  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 10.4  Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing (in U.S. dollars, average annual 
percentage change) 
Period  Korea  Taiwan 
1976- 79  17.06  13.98 
1979-82  2.20  9.74 
1982-86  -0.76  4.95 
Source:  BOK, Economics Statistics Yearbook, various issues, and Statistical  Yearbook of  the  Republic of 
China. various issues. 
Note; Unit labor costs are defined as the nominal wages relative to value-added productivities. 
wage increases. Throughout most of its recent history, nominal wages have 
grown  more  quickly  than  prices,  however  real  wage  increases  have 
frequently been bounded by  productivity growth (see table 10.1). 
This section provides an overview of key aspects of Korean labor markets 
to shed some light on the determinants of nominal wage growth. We  focus 
on characteristics evident during Korea’s industrialization and adjustment to 
the  1979-80  crisis. The demonstrations, strikes,  and other labor activities 
since 1986 may signify some important changes in wage determination and 
in  the  relationship between  workers,  management,  and  the  government. 
However, it is too early to assess these developments. 
The discussion, which draws heavily on work by  Kim Sookon (1982) and 
Lindauer (1984), is based on data for wages and Compensation of  private, 
nonagricultural workers in the formal sector and of public sector employees. 
Unfortunately, earnings  data  for  the  informal  urban  sector,  consisting  of 
small-scale and family businesses, are not available.2 The discussion begins 
with an outline of compensation, labor mobility, and the role of institutional 
factors in  Korean  labor markets.  It  then  focuses  on  wage  determination, 
considering the relevance of a competitive labor market model for Korea, the 
link  between  wages  and  prices,  and  the  importance  of  government 
intervention. 
Employee  compensation  in  Korea  is  quite  ~omplex.~  The  total  is 
composed  of  a  basic  wage,  allowances,  and  a  bonus.  The  basic  wage 
includes a starting wage plus annual increments arising, for example, from 
seniority, merit, and cost-of-living increases. It is typically the largest part of 
total compensation, ranging from 50 to 60 percent for production workers, 
and  sometimes  reaching  80  percent  of  compensation  for  managers, 
professionals, and  technician^.^ 
The importance of allowances varies widely by  industry and occupation. 
Some allowances, such as overtime and annual leave, are stipulated by  the 
Labor Standards law. Many others, including allowances for special skills, 
family, housing, and transportation, are not. Their coverage differs widely 
across firms and across workers within firms.5 
Bonuses are not required by law, but remain extremely widespread. In one 
study, every firm  had paid out bonuses. Civil servants and public enterprise 279  KoredChapter 10 
employees also received  bonuses. On average, bonuses amounted to  400 
percent of base monthly earnings or about 15 percent of total compensation, 
however, again there was a wide variance, with large firms tending to pay 
out more. It is difficult to assess the extent to which bonuses are considered 
part  of  anticipated  compensation. In  general,  they  have  fluctuated with 
market conditions, although some large firms have maintained the level of 
bonuses during downturns. Overall, bonuses seem to have been increasing as 
a share of compensation. 
One implication of  the special structure of  Compensation in Korea is that 
neither basic  wage  figures nor total  compensation is  an  ideal measure of 
“required”  unit labor costs, i.e., an indicator of competitiveness. The wage 
numbers underestimate costs since they exclude some required payments. 
However, total compensation may also be biased because of its endogeneity. 
An  increase in  bonuses during a profitable year would  increase measured 
unit  labor  costs,  erroneously  indicating  that  Korea  was  becoming  less 
competitive vis-5-vis other countries. A better measure would combine basic 
wage with those allowances which the firm was obligated to pay and with the 
minimum bonus from the implicit contract between employer and employ- 
ees. Of  course, such a measure is unavailable. 
A second issue frequently discussed is the extent to which labor markets in 
Korea are characterized by  Japanese-style lifetime employment. On the one 
hand,  surveys  show  that  56 percent of  Korean  workers  would expect to 
continue full-time work  at normal pay  during a major downturn.6 On the 
other hand,  there  are no  explicit guarantees, and  there is  substantial job 
turnover.  Average monthly  separation rates in  manufacturing are above 5 
percent in  Korea, as compared to 4 percent in the U.S.  and  2 percent in 
Japan. (S. Kim  1982, 27). Lindauer concludes that “lifetime or permanent 
employment systems such as those that exist in Japan are not a feature of any 
significant sector of  the Korean economy” (1984, 61). 
A  third  issue  is  whether  institutional factors,  such  as  unions  and/or 
government interventions, played a significant role from the 1960s through 
1985. The union movement in Korea remained weak and  subject to strict 
government regulations. Until  198  1 these regulations  included  a  ban  on 
strikes and a requirement of  prior government approval for any collective 
bargaining activities. The Worker  Council law  in  1980 called for all firms 
with thirty or more employees to hold council meetings, with management 
and  labor  equally  represented, to  discuss productivity  and  other  issues.’ 
However,  the  right  to  negotiate  wages  was  not  stipulated. Only  a  few 
industries, notably textiles and some public enterprises (e.g., rail, telephone 
and  telegraph, electric) had  unions. At  most, 20 percent of  the industrial 
work force belonged to a union. 
A consensus view is that unions have had a negligible impact on wages or 
total compensation, but that they have helped to increase job security. Those 
labor disputes which did occur focused not on wages and work conditions, 
but on issues of  worker rights in the work place (S. Kim  1982, 62). Using 280  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
wage regressions we find the coefficient on unionization  to be insignificantly 
different from zero, while separation rates tend to be substantially lower in 
unionized establishments. 
Although the government did not establish explicit wage guidelines,  there 
were a variety of less formal ways in which it could exert pressure on wage 
determination. There is also some evidence of intervention in private sector 
wage determination. In 1977, concern over real wage increases in excess of 
productivity  growth  led the government  to announce  that for monopolistic 
firms  with  controlled  prices  there  would  be  a  ceiling  on  allowed  price 
increases due to rising labor costs.’  At the same time, the government began 
to follow a policy which based wage increases on productivity increases. A 
reduction in the growth of  public sector wages was announced in  1980. 
While  the  Ministry  of  Labor  continues  to  take  a  stand  against  direct 
government intervention in wage negotiations,  the Ministry of Finance has 
seemed to favor some intervention since 1981. In November  1981 the BOK 
directed all banks to enforce a Korea Bankers Association (KBA) resolution 
to  stop  new  loans  to  firms  which,  despite  financial  difficulties,  increased 
wages beyond labor productivity.’  This resolution was reiterated  in  1982 as 
part of  a nationwide mass media campaign to bring down inflation. 
If  implicit or explicit  government  policies  significantly  influenced  wage 
determination,  one would expect public  sector wages to act as a signal for 
appropriate wage growth in the private sector. lo Empirical evidence provides 
little support for the view that the government acted as a wage leader prior to 
1980. There is no obvious correlation between public and private earnings. 
Public sector employees earned less than those working in the private sector, 
with the differential increasing with skill and educational levels. In response, 
public  sector  earnings  rose  much  more  rapidly  than  did  private  sector 
earnings  from  1972 to  1976.  During  the  push  toward  heavy  industry  in 
1976-79,  earnings  grew  more  quickly  in  the  private  than  in  the  public 
sector, outstripping productivity gains.  Since 1979 both public and private 
earnings growth rates have declined substantially.  The moderation of public 
sector wages began in  1981 as part of  the effort to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
Since then, the government has taken a more active stand on incomes policy, 
as  discussed  above.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  importance of  these 
factors, relative to the importance of changing economic conditions (notably 
the  drop  in  inflation  and  the  relative  scarcity  of  skilled  labor),  in  the 
subsequent slowdown of  private wage growth. 
Given all of the factors discussed above, what is an appropriate model for 
wage determination in Korea?”  Most authors conclude that wages have been 
determined  primarily  by  market  forces  since  the  early  to  mid- 1970s. 
Lindauer  bases  his  conclusion  on  the  following  findings  for  the  formal 
sector:  that  real  wage  trends  have  been  similar  across  industries,  that  the 
structure of interindustry earnings has been stable with a recent narrowing of 
the  dispersion,  and  that  educational  wage  differentials  track  relative 281  KoredChapter 10 
scarcities  in  skilled  1ab0r.l~  He  concludes  that  the  major  inefficiency  in 
Korean  labor  markets  arises  from  the  large  and  persistent  wage  and 
employment  differences  by  sex. The rapid  real  wage increases  during  the 
1970s  have  no  obvious  institutional  explanation,  but  can  be  readily 
understood  from  changes  in  the  structures  of  labor  supply  and  demand. 
Amsden (1986), who finds a much greater role for government intervention, 
also concludes that market forces were the  key  factors in  wage determina- 
tion. 
The evidence for a competitive model of wage determination for the 1980s 
is much less clear. As pointed out above, it is difficult to distinguish market 
pressures from direct and indirect government pressures. It is also difficult to 
assess the extent to which the government became more interventionist.  On 
the one hand,  collective  bargaining regulations  were relaxed.  On the other 
hand,  government  attention  to  incomes  policies  clearly  increased.  This 
concern, together  with  the  increased  leverage  of  the banking  system  over 
private firms, expands the scope for intervention.  We  conclude this  section 
by  highlighting  some  features  of  the  Korean  labor  market.  First,  there  is 
relatively  little  inertia  in  the  wage-setting  process  in  Korea.  Instead  of  a 
backward-looking  or  indexation  scheme,  wages  seem to  react  quickly  to 
changing market  conditions.  Second, the  increased  reliance  of  the private 
sector  on  the  organized  domestic  financial  sector  during  the  early  1980s 
expanded  the  government’s  ability  to exert an  influence on private  sector 
wage determination.  Finally, organized resistance to any pressure (actual or 
potential)  on  wages  from  the  government  was  negligible  through  the 
mid-1980s.  There  has  been  a  marked  increase  in  worker  activism  since 
1986, however, it is too early to assess the longer term implications. 
10.4  Discussion 
This chapter has highlighted two factors in explaining Korea’s  ability to 
combine a real depreciation with real wage growth. The key has been rapid 
increases in  labor productivity  which drive a wedge between the minimum 
wage  increase  for  real  wage  gains  and  the  maximum  increase  for 
competitiveness  gains.  As  argued in chapter 7, the key  to Korea’s growth 
has been its very rapid augmentation of both capital and labor. 
The second factor has been the determination of  wages. Weak unions and 
worker  organizations  have  had  a  negligible  effect  on  wage  adjustments. 
Instead,  Korean  wages  seemed  to  adjust  relatively  quickly  to  changing 
market conditions throughout  the  1970s. The lack of  wage  indexation  has 
removed  some  of  the  inertia  in  wage  adjustment  frequently  seen  in  Latin 
American  countries.  Additional  flexibility  is introduced  by  the  system  of 
compensation in which a substantial share of worker compensation  is in the 
form of  bonus payments,  which can be reduced during downturns. In some 
respects, Korea workers with their growing real wages have fared well under 282  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
this system. The costs, which come in terms of limited influence over worker 
rights and work conditions,  are very difficult to quantify. 
A final point  worth  stressing is that’tradeoffs between real  incomes and 
competitiveness  are  only  avoided  once  the  investment-productivity  gain 
cycle gets going. Korea cut real wages to give an initial boost and to get the 
“engine”  moving  both  in  the  early  1960s  and  during  adjustments  in 
1980-81. 
11  Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
In this chapter we assess the role of fiscal and monetary policy in Korea’s 
experience with external debt. One important issue is the financing of fiscal 
deficits.  Did the government borrow heavily from abroad or rapidly expand 
the domestic money  supply in order to finance large budget deficits? Both 
factors figured prominently  in the experience of many Latin American debtor 
countries, however, both turn out to play much smaller parts for Korea. Still 
they  are  of  interest  precisely  because  they  highlight  some  of  the  aspects 
which  distinguish  Korea’s  debt  history  from  the  history  of  many  other 
countries which have had less successful recoveries. 
A second issue is the role of fiscal and monetary  policies in achieving the 
phenomenal  growth  rates  which  have  enabled  Korea  to service  very  large 
external debts.  To  summarize  our conclusions  at the outset, we  argue that 
fiscal policies have been  used countercyclically,  but that they  were not  the 
predominant explanation for rapid growth. Monetary policies,  on the other 
hand,  have played  a  central role, although  not  through  excessive  inflation 
finance because the  allocation of  domestic credit has been a centerpiece  in 
the  government’s  industrial  policies  which  have  successfully  targeted 
high-growth export industries. 
11.1  Brief History 
An  overview of  the  development  of  Korea’s  financial  and  fiscal  sectors 
provides a useful base for examining the current systems.’ The key issues of 
the  linkages  between  government  finances,  monetary  policy,  and  external 
borrowing  are not new,  but emerged  at the outset as Korea recovered  first 
from World War I1 and then from the Korean War. 
The  developments  through  the  early  1970s  can  be  divided  into  three 
stages.  In  the  early  stage,  prior  to  1945,  Korea  enjoyed  a  very  highly 
developed financial system run by the Japanese to mobilize resources for the 
colonial expansion and later to help finance military spending.  The system 